Medary.com

That's what researchers are looking into, in this ScienceDaily story:

Suggestions of a statin link are not new, but the results of a recent study linking low LDL cholesterol to Parkinson's provide the strongest evidence to date that it could be real, because statins work by reducing LDL cholesterol. The study by researchers at University of North Carolina showed that patients with low levels of LDL cholesterol are more than three and a half times more likely to develop Parkinson's disease than those with higher LDL levels.

Yours truly is in fact on a statin to lower my cholesterol.  So, do I want to die of a heart attack or stroke, or do I want to die of Parkinson's?

It may very well turn out that LDL cholesterol isn't "bad" at all.  Just misunderstood.  (OK, I couldn't resist that one).

My thoughts turn to a phrase. . . something about the cure being worse than the disease.  Thanks a lot, modern medicine . . .

Consider these two passages. One is (or should be) well-known. The other is authored by Senator Harry Reid, (D-Nevada), our current Senate Majority Leader.

On second thought, perhaps Passage #1 is not as well-known, or well-understood, as it should be.

Passage #1:

Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.

Passage #2:

SEC. 220. DISCLOSURE OF PAID EFFORTS TO STIMULATE GRASSROOTS LOBBYING.

(a) Definitions- Section 3 of the Act (2 U.S.C. 1602) is amended--
(1) in paragraph (7), by adding at the end of the following: `Lobbying activities include paid efforts to stimulate grassroots lobbying, but do not include grassroots lobbying.'; and
(2) by adding at the end of the following:
`(17) GRASSROOTS LOBBYING- The term `grassroots lobbying' means the voluntary efforts of members of the general public to communicate their own views on an issue to Federal officials or to encourage other members of the general public to do the same.
`(18) PAID EFFORTS TO STIMULATE GRASSROOTS LOBBYING-
`(A) IN GENERAL- The term `paid efforts to stimulate grassroots lobbying' means any paid attempt in support of lobbying contacts on behalf of a client to influence the general public or segments thereof to contact one or more covered legislative or executive branch officials (or Congress as a whole) to urge such officials (or Congress) to take specific action with respect to a matter described in section 3(8)(A), except that such term does not include any communications by an entity directed to its members, employees, officers, or shareholders.
`(B) PAID ATTEMPT TO INFLUENCE THE GENERAL PUBLIC OR SEGMENTS THEREOF- The term `paid attempt to influence the general public or segments thereof' does not include an attempt to influence directed at less than 500 members of the general public.
`(C) REGISTRANT- For purposes of this paragraph, a person or entity is a member of a registrant if the person or entity--
`(i) pays dues or makes a contribution of more than a nominal amount to the entity;
`(ii) makes a contribution of more than a nominal amount of time to the entity;
`(iii) is entitled to participate in the governance of the entity;
`(iv) is 1 of a limited number of honorary or life members of the entity; or
`(v) is an employee, officer, director or member of the entity.
`(19) GRASSROOTS LOBBYING FIRM- The term `grassroots lobbying firm' means a person or entity that--
`(A) is retained by 1 or more clients to engage in paid efforts to stimulate grassroots lobbying on behalf of such clients; and
`(B) receives income of, or spends or agrees to spend, an aggregate of $25,000 or more for such efforts in any quarterly period.'.
(b) Registration- Section 4(a) of the Act (2 U.S.C. 1603(a)) is amended--
(1) in the flush matter at the end of paragraph (3)(A), by adding at the end the following: `For purposes of clauses (i) and (ii), the term `lobbying activities' shall not include paid efforts to stimulate grassroots lobbying.'; and
(2) by inserting after paragraph (3) the following:
`(4) FILING BY GRASSROOTS LOBBYING FIRMS- Not later than 45 days after a grassroots lobbying firm first is retained by a client to engage in paid efforts to stimulate grassroots lobbying, such grassroots lobbying firm shall register with the Secretary of the Senate and the Clerk of the House of Representatives.'.
(c) Separate Itemization of Paid Efforts To Stimulate Grassroots Lobbying- Section 5(b) of the Act (2 U.S.C. 1604(b)) is amended--
(1) in paragraph (3), by--
(A) inserting after `total amount of all income' the following: `(including a separate good faith estimate of the total amount of income relating specifically to paid efforts to stimulate grassroots lobbying and, within that amount, a good faith estimate of the total amount specifically relating to paid advertising)'; and
(B) inserting `or a grassroots lobbying firm' after `lobbying firm';
(2) in paragraph (4), by inserting after `total expenses' the following: `(including a good faith estimate of the total amount of expenses relating specifically to paid efforts to stimulate grassroots lobbying and, within that total amount, a good faith estimate of the total amount specifically relating to paid advertising)'; and
(3) by adding at the end the following:
`Subparagraphs (B) and (C) of paragraph (2) shall not apply with respect to reports relating to paid efforts to stimulate grassroots lobbying activities.'.
(d) Good Faith Estimates and De Minimis Rules for Paid Efforts To Stimulate Grassroots Lobbying-
(1) IN GENERAL- Section 5(c) of the Act (2 U.S.C. 1604(c)) is amended to read as follows:
`(c) Estimates of Income or Expenses- For purposes of this section, the following shall apply:
`(1) Estimates of income or expenses shall be made as follows:
`(A) Estimates of amounts in excess of $10,0000 shall be rounded to the nearest $20,000.
`(B) In the event income or expenses do not exceed $10,000, the registrant shall include a statement that income or expenses totaled less than $10,000 for the reporting period.
`(2) Estimates of income or expenses relating specifically to paid efforts to stimulate grassroots lobbying shall be made as follows:
`(A) Estimates of amounts in excess of $25,000 shall be rounded to the nearest $20,000.
`(B) In the event income or expenses do not exceed $25,000, the registrant shall include a statement that income or expenses totaled less than $25,000 for the reporting period.'.
(2) TAX REPORTING- Section 15 of the Act (2 U.S.C. 1610) is amended--
(A) in subsection (a)--
(i) in paragraph (1), by striking `and' after the semicolon;
(ii) in paragraph (2), by striking the period and inserting `; and'; and
(iii) by adding at the end the following:
`(3) in lieu of using the definition of paid efforts to stimulate grassroots lobbying in section 3(18), consider as paid efforts to stimulate grassroots lobbying only those activities that are grassroots expenditures as defined in section 4911(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986.'; and
(B) in subsection (b)--
(i) in paragraph (1), by striking `and' after the semicolon;
(ii) in paragraph (2), by striking the period and inserting `; and'; and
(iii) by adding at the end the following:
`(3) in lieu of using the definition of paid efforts to stimulate grassroots lobbying in section 3(18), consider as paid efforts to stimulate grassroots lobbying only those activities that are grassroots expenditures as defined in section 4911(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986.'.

This seems to me to be a pretty significant "abridgement" of the freedom of speech and the right to seek "redress of grievances." Just having to wade through this legal gobbledegook abridges my rights--that's something that these jackasses don't ever seem to understand.

I don't care whether or not any of this BS purports to apply to me. Passage #1 says it doesn't, regardless of how many "grassroots lobbying firms" with which I may or may not choose to associate. (I'm not a joiner, by the way, if you couldn't tell . . . )

Of course, total, complete lack of respect for fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution is what I've come to expect from Democrats (and, sadly, some Republicans like John McCain).

Hat tip: Of Arms and the Law, via Instapundit.

UPDATE:  The Senate has passed an amendment to delete the above text from the bill.  So we stand down until the next attack on the Constitution from those who are sworn to defend it.

Blogger Bryan Preston embeds in Iraq, and comes to some conclusions about the mistakes we've made there:

1. No plan for the post war period.
2. Leaving Iran alone.
3. Pullbacks and soft failures.
4. Iraqi elections held too early.
5. Misunderstanding the fundamentals.
6. Assuming Iraq will conform only to unreasonable expectations which are based on ignorance of counterinsurgency warfare.
7. Media misconduct and malpractice leading to flagging homefront morale.

People who actually care about this will read his complete article.  People who are content in their angry ignorance won't.

It's really, really not about Bush any more.

"Nobody is here to tell the story of our people in this war . . . "

Except citizen-journalists like Michael Yon, reporting from Anbar Province, Iraq:

On this patrol, a soldier told me the story a young Iraqi girl who got shot in a firefight that blew out some important parts of her abdomen. Others around her were killed, but she would live, with a colostomy bag and no chance of ever having children. And when the soldier visited her, he said the young girl was not worried about who shot her, or who else had died around her, or what would happen to her tomorrow. She was worried about her goats. She was in the hospital shot to pieces worrying about her goats.

This does not look like a big or intense war to people at home. It doesn’t look like that because we have so few troops actually in combat. But for those who are truly fighting, this is a brutal death match where every mistake can get them killed, or make worldwide headlines. Yet when the enemy drills out eyes or tortures people with acid, it never resonates.

There is an explanation for why when some of these young soldiers and Marines go home and people are trying to talk with them they might be caught silently staring out a window. Many people back home seem to think they have an idea what is happening here, but most do not. And nobody is here to tell the story of our people in this war.

War is horror.  Sometimes you get to choose your wars, and sometimes the war chooses you.  We have the great luxury of choosing a war "over there" as opposed to a war over here.  This one has nothing to do with Democrats and Republicans.  Some people understand this.  Others do not.  Yet.

My lovely wife Snookums wrote this up in July, 2000. It may be useful to those who are contemplating a trip to Beijing, but make sure you verify all the information. The full .pdf version of this, with illustrations, is here. The PDF is the "official" version of the document, but I converted it to HTML for the casual reader--any errors in the HTML version are mine. --filbert


Why Beijing?

To escape my job in Tokyo, I visited Beijing June 8-13, 2000 and July 20-23, 2000. I loved it. The history is outstanding and the people/culture are very unique. These are my hints and tips in order for you to have successful trips like I did. I assume that the reader has a Beijing guidebook so these will just be some of the tips that weren’t in the guidebooks I used.

How else do you interpret this passage from Carter's latest book:

"It is imperative that the general Arab community and all significant Palestinian groups make it clear that they will end the suicide bombings and other acts of terrorism when international laws and the ultimate goals of the Roadmap for Peace are accepted by Israel."

The New York Post editorial which reveals this quote observes:

Carter isn't calling on the Palestinians to give up terror and murder now as a way to convince Israel they are serious about peace. Rather, he says they can wait until they've achieved their goals at the bargaining table. No need, says Carter, to give up terrorism until then.

Certainly, that's how 14 members of the Carter Center's advisory board read that paragraph. Indeed, it's why they angrily submitted their resignations last week.

That's also how Melvin Konner read it. He's a respected anthropology professor at Emory University and had been asked to be part of an academic group meant to advise the former president and the Carter Center on how to respond to criticism of the book.

As Konner wrote to John Hardman, the center's executive director, in declining the invitation: "I cannot find any way to read this sentence that does not condone the murder of Jews until such time as Israel unilaterally follows President Carter's prescription for peace. The sentence, simply put, makes President Carter an apologist for terrorists and places my children, along with all Jews everywhere, in greater danger."

Sadly, what many have come to expect from a man who will go down as possibly the single worst President in U.S. history.

Hat tip: Powerline

Yes, you read that headline correctly.  Fox News story (via the Belmont Club and Tigerhawk)

Karl Szmolinsky has been given a contract by North Korea to supply giant rabbits to help to boost meat production in the reclusive Communist country, which is suffering severe food shortages. The only problem is that such huge rabbits consume vast quantities of food themselves as they grow.

Szmolinsky, from Eberswalde, in the east of Germany, was contacted by the North Korean Embassy in Berlin in October after Robert attracted press coverage. “They want to boost meat production. They’ve arranged for me to go to Pyongyang in April to advise them on setting up a breeding farm,” Szmolinsky, who is 68 next month, told The Times.

A while back, I downloaded the Counterinsurgency Manual . . . the one that was written by the incoming U.S. General in Iraq, David Petraeus.

Does any of this sound familiar?

One common feature of insurgencies is that the government that is being targeted generally takes awhile to recognize that an insurgency is occuring.  Insurgents take advantage of that time to build strength and gather support.  Thus, counterinsurgents often have to "come from behind" when fighting an insurgency.  Another common feature is that forces conducting COIN operations usually begin poorly.  Western militaries too often neglect the study of insurgency.  They falsely believe that armies trained to win conventional wars are automatically prepared to win small, unconventional ones.  In fact, some capabilities required for conventional success--for example, the ability to execute operational maneuver and employ massive firepower--may be of limited utility or even counterproductive in COIN operations.  Nonetheless, conventional forces beginning COIN operations often try to use these capabilities to defeat insurgents;  they almost always fail.

The military forces that successfully defeat insurgencies are usually those able to overcome their institutional inclination to wage conventional war against insurgents.  They learn how to practice COIN and apply that knowledge.

Emphasis mine.

Well, maybe "attack" is a bit optimistic, but They're Here (er, um, there), the Iranian FARS news agency says so.

Deputy Governor General of Kerman province Abulghassem Nasrollahi told FNA that the crash which was followed by an explosion and a thick spiral of smoke has caused no casualties or damage to properties.

He further denied earlier reports that the explosion has been the result of a plane or chopper crash, reminding that all the passing aircrafts have been reported as sound and safe.

Via Gateway Pundit and Instapundit.

Hot off the White House web site:

The President's New Iraq Strategy Is Rooted In Six Fundamental Elements:

1. Let the Iraqis lead;
2. Help Iraqis protect the population;
3. Isolate extremists;
4. Create space for political progress;
5. Diversify political and economic efforts; and
6. Situate the strategy in a regional approach.

• Iraq Could Not Be Graver – The War On Terror Cannot Be Won If We Fail In Iraq.  Our enemies throughout the Middle East are trying to defeat us in Iraq.  If we step back now, the problems in Iraq will become more lethal, and make our troops fight an uglier battle than we are seeing today.

Key Elements Of The New Approach: Security

Iraqi:

• Publicly acknowledge all parties are responsible for quelling sectarian violence.
• Work with additional Coalition help to regain control of the capital and protect the Iraqi population.
• Deliver necessary Iraqi forces for Baghdad and protect those forces from political interference.
• Commit to intensify efforts to build balanced security forces throughout the nation that provide security even-handedly for all Iraqis.
• Plan and fund eventual demobilization program for militias.

Coalition:

• Agree that helping Iraqis to provide population security is necessary to enable accelerated transition and political progress.
• Provide additional military and civilian resources to accomplish this mission.
• Increase efforts to support tribes willing to help Iraqis fight Al Qaeda in Anbar.
• Accelerate and expand the embed program while minimizing risk to participants.

Both Coalition And Iraqi:

• Continue counter-terror operations against Al Qaeda and insurgent organizations.
• Take more vigorous action against death squad networks.
• Accelerate transition to Iraqi responsibility and increase Iraqi ownership.
• Increase Iraqi security force capacity – both size and effectiveness – from 10 to 13 Army divisions, 36 to 41 Army Brigades, and 112 to 132 Army Battalions.
  • Establish a National Operations Center, National Counterterrorism Force, and National Strike Force.
  • Reform the Ministry of Interior to increase transparency and accountability and transform the National Police.

Key Elements Of The New Approach: Political

Iraqi:

• The Government of Iraq commits to:
  • Reform its cabinet to provide even-handed service delivery.
  • Act on promised reconciliation initiatives (oil law, de-Baathification law, Provincial elections).
  • Give Coalition and ISF authority to pursue ALL extremists.

• All Iraqi leaders support reconciliation.
• Moderate coalition emerges as strong base of support for unity government.

Coalition:

• Support political moderates so they can take on the extremists.
  • Build and sustain strategic partnerships with moderate Shi'a, Sunnis, and Kurds.
• Support the national compact and key elements of reconciliation with Iraqis in the lead.
• Diversify U.S. efforts to foster political accommodation outside Baghdad (more flexibility for local commanders and civilian leaders).
  • Expand and increase the flexibility of the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) footprint.
  • Focus U.S. political, security, and economic resources at local level to open space for moderates, with initial priority to Baghdad and Anbar.

Both Coalition And Iraqi:

• Partnership between Prime Minister Maliki, Iraqi moderates, and the United States where all parties are clear on expectations and responsibilities.
• Strengthen the rule of law and combat corruption.
• Build on security gains to foster local and national political accommodations.
• Make Iraqi institutions even-handed, serving all of Iraq's communities on an impartial basis.

Key Elements Of The New Approach: Economic

Iraqi:

• Deliver economic resources and provide essential services to all areas and communities.
• Enact hydrocarbons law to promote investment, national unity, and reconciliation.
• Capitalize and execute jobs-producing programs.
• Match U.S. efforts to create jobs with longer term sustainable Iraqi programs.
• Focus more economic effort on relatively secure areas as a magnet for employment and growth.

Coalition:

• Refocus efforts to help Iraqis build capacity in areas vital to success of the government (e.g. budget execution, key ministries).
• Decentralize efforts to build Iraqi capacities outside the Green Zone.
  • Double the number of PRTs and civilians serving outside the Green Zone.
  • Establish PRT-capability within maneuver Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs).

• Greater integration of economic strategy with military effort.
  • Joint civil-military plans devised by PRT and BCT.
  • Remove legal and bureaucratic barriers to maximize cooperation and flexibility.

Key Elements Of The New Approach: Regional

Iraqi:

• Vigorously engage Arab states.
• Take the lead in establishing a regional forum to give support and help from the neighborhood.
• Counter negative foreign activity in Iraq.
• Increase efforts to counter PKK (Kurdistan Workers' Party).

Coalition:

• Intensify efforts to counter Iranian and Syrian influence inside Iraq.
• Increase military presence in the region.
• Strengthen defense ties with partner states in the region.
• Encourage Arab state support to Government of Iraq.
• Continue efforts to help manage relations between Iraq and Turkey.
• Continue to seek the region's full support in the War on Terror.

Both Coalition And Iraqi:

• Focus on the International Compact.
• Retain active U.N. engagement in Iraq – particularly for election support and constitutional review.


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